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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BILLS TO PAY AND MOUTHS TO FEED: FORFEITURE AND DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS AFTER ALVAREZ V. SMITH
INTRODUCTION
Chermane Smith could be anyone. She could be a single mother working
two jobs to make ends meet. She could be a volunteer at a nursing home on
Tuesday nights and a deacon in her church on Sunday mornings. Chermane
Smith could be anyone, and anyone could be Chermane Smith.1 Anyone could
trust their boyfriend or brother with their car for an afternoon. Anyone could
have a fiancé or an aunt who needed a fix so badly that they had to find a ride.
But mostly, anyone could wait restlessly into the night, pacing by the phone,
only to get a midnight call: Your boyfriend is under arrest. We found him with
a trunk full of drugs. We’re going to have to hold on to your car for a while.
Anyone could get that call. Chermane Smith could be anyone.
In Alvarez v. Smith, Chermane Smith and five other respondents
challenged the seizure of their property by the Chicago Police Department and
its officers without, they claimed on appeal, a grant of sufficient due process.2
Chicago police, pursuant to Illinois’s Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act
(DAFPA), seized Smith’s car based on its connection with alleged drug
activity and forced her to wait over a year for a hearing regarding its return.3
Following an adverse ruling by the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the police had violated the procedural due process
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the respondents
were entitled to specific post-seizure hearings to determine whether their
property should be released or subjected to forfeiture under DAFPA.4 State’s
Attorney Anita Alvarez appealed that decision, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.5 After a contentious oral argument, the Court found the case to be

1. David G. Savage, Deciding “What the Law Is”, AMERICA.GOV (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2009/October/20091015150918wrybakcuh0.1189081
.html (describing the circumstances of the seizure of Chermane Smith’s vehicle).
2. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 579 (2009).
3. Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–9 (2004)
(Supp. 2005). In addition to Smith’s property, the police seized the vehicles of respondents
Edmanuel Perez and Tyhesha Brunston and cash held by respondents Michelle Waldo, Kirk
Yunker, and Tony Williams. Respondents’ Brief at 1, 3 Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576 (2009)
(No. 08-351).
4. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008).
5. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 576.
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moot and dismissed the State of Illinois’s appeal—but also unexpectedly
vacated the opinion of the Seventh Circuit.6
Alvarez v. Smith was properly held moot for failing to present the Court
with an active case or controversy, but it will likely lead to procedural
dilemmas for future forfeiture claims.7 Due to the interplay between time limits
in forfeiture statutes and mootness doctrine, the Court’s unexpected vacatur of
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, and the procedural limitations on forfeiture
claims, the Court’s holding in Alvarez v. Smith is likely to complicate future
forfeiture jurisprudence.
To properly address these complications, this Note will explore the
relationship of forfeiture to due process. Part I will explore the history of civil
forfeiture, which allows law enforcement officials at every governmental level
to seize property associated with illegal activity under color of law, without
resorting to the processes and burdens of the criminal courts.8 Part II will trace
the historical path that led the Court to grant certiorari in Alvarez, so as to
better answer the question of whether the Court’s determination was justified.
While the Court stated that its holding would ease future litigation of forfeiture
disputes,9 Part III will detail the complications that have blossomed from the
Court’s holding. Finally, Part IV will examine whether the hearing framework
presented in Smith v. City of Chicago10 should have been upheld and then
discuss whether it would have advanced due process as applied to forfeiture.
Only by working through these issues can the questions that remain after
Alvarez v. Smith be properly resolved.
I. FORFEITURE: FROM INCEPTION TO EXPANSION
To understand why Alvarez resulted in such a procedural morass, it is
necessary to first have an understanding of the development and current use of
forfeiture in criminal circumstances.

6. Id. at 578. The real surprise in the opinion was not the mootness result but the vacatur of
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
7. Both relitigation and future litigation of similar claims will be affected by the Court’s
decision due to the loss of the hearing requirement and the emphasis placed on class certification
in similar claims. See infra Part IV.C.2.
8. While forfeiture has been used extensively by law enforcement agencies to supplement
their funding, it also presents opportunities for violations of the due process rights of those from
whom property is taken. See Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 779, 782 (2009) (detailing the expanded use and resultant dangers of
civil forfeiture actions taken by law enforcement agencies).
9. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583.
10. 524 F.3d 834.
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The Development of Forfeiture in America

In the United States, civil forfeiture commonly takes place concurrent
with—rather than separate from—state or federal criminal prosecution.11 As a
result of this setup, forfeiture actions can both punish crimes12 and—through
the use of their proceeds—alleviate societal damages associated with criminal
activity.13
Although early references to forfeiture were made in biblical texts,14 the
doctrine did not reach its current form until it was developed under the
common law.15 In common law England, proceeds from the sale of property
associated with crimes were forfeited to the sovereign as “deodands,” which
acted as a tool of compensation for the costs resulting from the carelessness of
subjects.16 American forfeiture law developed from these common law
beginnings, and continued not only the practice of forfeiting property to the
government but also the tradition of identifying the property itself as the
defendant in any claim.17
While forfeiture has existed in this country since its inception, forfeiture
was not exercised extensively until the passage of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.18 That law, which widened the
acceptable circumstances for forfeiture, led to an unprecedented expansion of

11. Cf. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503
(7th Cir. 2005).
12. See Melissa A. Rolland, Comment, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause, and United States v. Bajakajian, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1999)
(“[F]orfeiture law became a major tool in the war on crime and drugs.”).
13. Cf. Moores, supra note 8, at 780–81 (“[O]bject[s] or animal[s] involved in a wrong
against a human . . . . were given to the lord or king ‘in the belief that the [k]ing would . . . insure
that the [forfeited item] was put to [good] charitable uses.’”) (fourth alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681
(1974)).
14. David Benjamin Ross, Comment, Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction That Offends Due Process,
13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 261 (2000) (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.17 (quoting
Exodus 21:28)).
15. Id.
16. Id.; Moores, supra note 8 at 780–81. For further discussion of deodands, see CaleroToledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16 (“Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, to be given to
God.”) (internal quotations omitted).
17. Moores, supra note 8, at 781 (describing the adaptation of in rem proceedings to U.S.
admiralty cases). For more recent examples, see United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461
U.S. 555 (1983); In re Various Items of Pers. Prop., 282 U.S. 577 (1931); United States v.
$191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1994).
18. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006)).
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property seizure by law enforcement officials.19 However, after public
backlash began to grow over the excessive and improper use of forfeiture,20
Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act in 2000 to provide
more specific guidance as to when and under what circumstances forfeiture
actions would be appropriate.21
Forfeiture actions originated at the federal level, however, numerous states
have adopted statutes allowing state agencies to engage in forfeiture actions
similar to those pioneered by the federal government.22 Such legislation often
serves to unify state and federal forfeiture practices and thereby ensures that
state seizures will fulfill all federal requirements.23
This unification has led to a set of general standards as to when and under
what circumstances forfeiture is appropriate:
Three elements must be present in order to subject a claimant’s property to
civil forfeiture . . . : (1) the subject property must be moneys, negotiable
instruments, securities, or other things of value; (2) there must be probable
cause to believe that there exists illicit drug activity that renders the seized
property subject to forfeiture; and (3) there must be probable cause to believe
that a connection, or nexus, exists between the seized property and the
24
predicate activity the government has identified.

In the United States, much as in common law England, forfeiture
encourages property owners to carefully manage their property by setting forth
applicable consequences should that property be used for illicit purposes.25
This history and purpose not only establish forfeiture as a unique process, but

19. Cf. Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in the Assets, 18 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 46 (2008) (describing an “explosion of cases” related to federal
and state forfeiture laws implemented in the 1970s).
20. See Brant C. Hadaway, Comment, Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why The Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of Forfeiture, 55 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 81, 81–84 (2000) (detailing abuses of forfeiture power leading up to the passage of
the Act in 2000).
21. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981–984) (2006) (expanding forfeiture actions to include additional property
types while establishing a set framework for forfeiture proceedings).
22. See, e.g., Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–9
(2004) (Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703 (West 2001) (Supp. 2009).
23. Compare Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. at
150/4(1), with Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act § 983(a)(1)(A)(i).
24. United States v. $10,700 in U.S. Currency, 258 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing inter
alia 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)). Although this provision deals with actions related to drug crimes,
restrictions on all forfeiture actions were contained in Section 2 of the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2006).
25. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 41 (1995) (detailing the use of forfeiture as a
punishment).
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also provide government agencies with justification for taking advantage of
forfeiture’s substantial financial benefits.
B.

Taking Back From Thieves: The Benefits of Effective Forfeiture

When properly performed, forfeiture fulfills the dual purposes of denying
assets critical to criminal operations and providing law enforcement agencies
with financial assistance.26
Soon after forfeiture was approved as a tool of law enforcement, federal
agencies began seizing assets associated with criminal activity that were
discovered in the course of investigations.27 This practice became a
phenomenal success, with the prime example being the DEA’s ability to
finance almost the entirety of its 1987 budget through funds obtained via
seizure.28 Not wanting to be left out, state governments quickly implemented
programs allowing state and local authorities to engage in similar forfeiture
actions.29 With these additions, forfeiture rapidly expanded at both the state
and federal levels to reach an impressive a financial scope. This could be seen
in 2008, when the Department of Justice took possession of over $443 million
in assets seized through just five civil forfeiture actions.30
In addition to its monetary benefits, authorities praise forfeiture for its
effectiveness in disrupting the functional abilities of large-scale illegal
operations.31 While the confiscation of small amounts of narcotics may
destroy the business of one drug dealer, proponents argue that forfeiture can
even more efficiently assist in the war on drugs by enabling law enforcement
to seize large amounts of cash, thereby crippling major trafficking operations.32
Based on forfeiture’s financial and punitive effectiveness, it is no wonder
that it is so commonly used by law enforcement agencies. It must be
recognized, however, that while forfeiture can provide agencies with immense
benefits when used properly, its self-serving nature also presents the
temptation for misuse.33

26. J. Mitchell Miller & Lance H. Selva, Drug Enforcement’s Double-Edged Sword: An
Assessment of Asset Forfeiture Programs, 11 JUST. Q. 313, 314–15 (1994).
27. Id. at 316–17.
28. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Contesting Government’s Financial Interest in
Drug Cases, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1999, at 4, 6.
29. Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 317 (“By 1985, 47 states had passed [forfeiture]
legislation.”).
30. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REP. 09-19, ASSETS
FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT FISCAL
YEAR 2008, at 6 (2009).
31. See Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 318.
32. Id.
33. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 5.
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C. Becoming Thieves Themselves: The Dangers of Excessive Forfeiture
While forfeiture benefits society by financially supporting the efforts of
law enforcement agencies, it also presents constitutional risks that cannot be
ignored.34 Individuals subjected to forfeiture face a direct threat to their
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process if they are not given an
opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of a seizure.35 When property is seized
and owners are denied a meaningful opportunity to explain their
circumstances, the underlying deprivation imposes an unjustified burden on the
individual subjected to forfeiture.36
In addition to these procedural dangers, forfeiture can adversely influence
the motivations of law enforcement officials. While forfeiture’s greatest
advantage may be the financial windfall that law enforcement agencies reap
from seizing assets associated with criminal activity, excessive dependence on
forfeited funds can lead to questionable seizures of property unrelated to the
crime committed or devoid of procedural protections.37 In this way, forfeiture
can create a perverse incentive for law enforcement officials to target certain
criminal activity specifically because of its forfeiture implications.38
Departments that rely excessively on funds obtained from such activities may
be sapped with internal corruption and may be more prone to perform illicit
searches, arrests, and seizures with the aim towards financial gain.39 Forfeiture
presents a “double-edged sword” to departments: It provides great financial
benefits but also tempts them to obtain those benefits illicitly.40
While civil forfeiture can be a valuable and effective tool for fighting
crime, the dangers it presents to both due process and the priorities of law
enforcement agencies require that caution temper any praise given.

34. There are some constitutional rights that are not implicated by forfeiture. Civil forfeiture
actions do not constitute violations of an individual’s Fifth Amendment right to avoid double
jeopardy. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996). Nor does forfeiture implicate the
Fourth Amendment right to avoid unreasonable searches and seizures. See Florida v. White, 526
U.S. 559, 563–64 (1999).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 315 (citing
journalistic accounts of civil liberties violations resulting from enforced asset forfeiture).
36. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (detailing how a violation of
due process can be associated with improper seizure and biased seizure procedures).
37. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 7.
38. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons
From Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 89 (1996). While this is most often
seen in improperly motivated seizures, it can also be seen in where the police do not seize
property. Cf. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 8 (describing the police practice of targeting
budget-padding cash for seizure, rather than drugs that would be destroyed).
39. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 5.
40. Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 313, 328–31.
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUE PROCESS
AND FORFEITURE
Forfeiture implicates a number of Constitutional freedoms—most notably
the right to due process of the law.41 The following section details the
progression of due process rights within forfeiture matters, and pays particular
attention to a recent case that allows those rights to leap forward.
A.

Early Developments in Due Process and Forfeiture

There has been considerable controversy over what procedures are needed
to guarantee due process during forfeiture actions, primarily on the questions
of whether hearings are required before property is taken and how extensive
those hearings might need to be.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that procedural due process
required that an evidentiary hearing be held before recipients of state or federal
welfare programs were forced to forfeit benefits.42 Justice Brennan wrote that
it was irrelevant that benefits were a “privilege and not a right;”43 so long as an
interest that resembled property was seized by the government, relevant
constitutional constraints applied.44 Justice Brennan realized that not all
property rights would be protected,45 but he held that so long as an individual’s
“interest in avoiding that loss outweigh[ed] the government’s interest in
summary adjudication,” due process required additional proceedings.46
Later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court broke from the bare-bones
procedure in Goldberg and set forth a more developed framework for
determining what proceedings were necessary to protect due process in
forfeiture actions.47 Specifically, Justice Powell held that three factors had to
be considered when determining whether a hearing was required under due
process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function

41. See Ross, supra note 14, at 263–64 (noting courts have avoided the requirements of due
process to justify seizure).
42. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
43. Id. at 262 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 262 & n.8 (referring to the property interest present in social security benefits).
45. Id. at 263 (referring to non-welfare government benefits).
46. Id.
47. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
48
substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Through this framework, Mathews gave rise to an expanded set of
circumstances where probable cause hearings would be necessary to protect
due process rights.49
Mathews’s elasticity becomes apparent in cases such as United States v.
Farmer, where the plaintiff requested a probable cause hearing after officers
confiscated a large amount of cash during a drug-related arrest.50 Since the
government was unable to show that this act would be unduly burdensome, the
court ordered a hearing to determine if the seizure was proper.51 Through the
holding in Farmer, the court was able to demonstrate that the Mathews
standard was flexible enough to apply to due process controversies stemming
from disparate factual circumstances.52 This flexibility, though, did not
prevent the court from breaking away from Mathews under certain
circumstances.
In $8,850 in U.S. Currency and Von Neumann, the Court diverged from
Mathews by determining the need for hearings in accordance with speedy trial
standards.53 In those cases, the Court found that since due process would be
primarily infringed upon by the delay between seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, the speedy-trial test advanced in Barker v. Wingo should be
invoked in order to balance the interests of both the prosecution and the
defendant.54 In weighing those interests, the Court in Barker based its analysis
on four factors: 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the
defendant’s assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant.”55
While the Court in Barker adjudged the necessity of hearings to support due
process by balancing factors, it diverged from the frameworks set forth in

48. Id.
49. See Susan G. Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process, and Protective
Proceedings: Are Our Probate Codes Unconstitutional?, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 57, 66–67
(1999) (describing Mathews’s expansion of Goldberg’s factors). Ironically, in Mathews itself, the
Court applied these factors and determined that additional proceedings were not required due to
the elaborate administrative benefits already in place. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
50. United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 802 (4th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the plaintiff
requested a hearing as to whether all of his funds should have been subject to seizure, as he could
not afford representation without at least a portion of the seized proceeds. Id. at 804.
51. Id. at 805.
52. For a similarly flexible application of the Mathews standard to real property, see United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–55 (1993).
53. United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); United States v. $8,850 in
U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983).
54. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 251; $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. at 564.
55. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
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Mathews and Farmer by placing higher weight on the timing of the hearings
themselves.56
Similarly, in Dusenberry, the Court further separated itself from a
complete reliance on the hearing provisions in Mathews by stating that it
“never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due
process claims.”57 The Court recognized that parties whose property had been
seized were entitled to “notice and an opportunity to be heard,”58 but it adopted
a more straightforward test that allowed for the fulfillment of due process, so
long as notice was reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to inform
the party of the pending forfeiture.59 This test gave the government a
significantly lower burden of proof in order to deny additional hearings and
seemed to lower the standard needed for fulfillment of due process.60
The difference between the due process standards in Barker and
Dusenberry and the standard utilized in Mathews presented a conflict in need
of an interpretive ruling. But, just like divergences in any other area of law,
conflicts in due process and forfeiture can only be resolved by a case
crystallizing the problem. For these topics, it seemed that Smith v. City of
Chicago could have been that case.61
B.

Smith v. City of Chicago—A Turning Point

Smith was a combination of six separate claims of allegedly improper
forfeiture.62 Each of the plaintiffs’ property had been seized by Chicago police
officers pursuant to DAFPA, which enabled law enforcement officials to
subject drug-related property to forfeiture proceedings that would provide state
agencies with a direct benefit.63 After seizure, the plaintiffs were denied
hearings related to their seized property and were forced to wait for more than
a year to contest its forfeiture.64

56. See id.
57. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002).
58. Id. at 167 (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48
(1993).
59. Id. at 167, 169.
60. See id. at 168–73 (finding that sending a letter by certified mail to the prison where the
defendant was housed was reasonably calculated under the circumstances to inform the party of
the forfeiture).
61. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2008).
62. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3. Three of the plaintiffs had their automobiles
seized by the police without being charged with an offense. Id. The other three had cash seized.
Id.
63. Id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/505(g) (2004) (allocating proceeds from
forfeitures: 65% to the law enforcement agency involved in the seizure; 25% to the prosecuting
attorney’s office, and 10% surrendered as court costs).
64. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3–4.
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The plaintiffs argued that DAFPA’s timetable for resolving forfeiture
disputes65 violated due process by effectively preventing them from setting
forth the innocent-owner defense permitted under Illinois law.66 All six
plaintiffs filed for injunctive relief to prevent the State from applying DAFPA,
claiming that due process required an opportunity for prompt, post-seizure
hearings to determine the propriety of forfeiture action.67
The district court was not convinced that this relief was necessary and
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims based on a prior contrary Seventh Circuit
holding.68 The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court’s
dismissal,69 noting that while it had previously refused to hear challenges to
forfeiture policy, it had only done so because due process was generally
satisfied when proceedings were instituted within a reasonable period after
seizure.70 The court expressed serious doubts that its own precedent was still
controlling and used the Mathews framework to readdress the due process
question.71 After looking to previous opinions that applied Mathews to
seizures involving automobiles, the court concluded that prompt post-seizure
retention hearings, with adequate notice, were necessary for these seizures to
satisfy due process.72
Due to the number of salient factors present in the seizure of an
automobile, the court held that probable cause needed to be shown before full
forfeiture could take place.73 The hardship posed by the loss of transportation,

65. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/5–6 (2004) (Supp. 2005). Following seizure, a state agency
will have fifty-two days to decide whether to recommend that the prosecutor file a forfeiture
action. Id. at 150/5. The prosecutor then has an additional forty-five days to review the forfeiture
recommendation. Id. at 150/6. Only after the prosecutor decides to file for forfeiture is notice
sent to the owner, who then has forty-five days to file a verified claim and post a cost bond. Id. at
150/6(C)(1). Bond is set at 10% of the value assigned to the property by Petitioner or $100,
whichever is greater. Id. at 150/6(C)(2). Posting bond does not result in release of the seized
property and functions, in effect, as a filing fee. Id. Following the issuance of a claim or bond,
another forty-five days can pass before the hearing, allowing for 187 days total to pass between a
seizure and any hearing on its propriety. Id.
66. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3–4; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. at 150/8(A)
(setting forth Illinois’s innocent-owner defense).
67. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 4; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. at 150/9
(requiring an ultimate forfeiture proceeding).
68. See Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 835 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that in the
district court, plaintiffs conceded that their complaint should be dismissed); see also Jones v.
Takaki, 38 F.3d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claims for injunctive relief under DAFPA).
69. Smith, 524 F.3d at 839.
70. Id. at 836 (citing Jones, 38 F.3d at 324).
71. Id. at 836–38 (rejecting the application of the standard utilized in Jones in favor of that
found in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
72. Id. at 837.
73. Id. at 837–38. The court cited a number of salient factors in assessing the private
interests, including the possibility that there may be an innocent owner of the seized automobile,
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the court held, required an opportunity for the owner to be heard.74 This was
particularly true when the driver of the vehicle, rather than its owner, was the
individual engaged in the activity that justified the seizure.75
The court expressed its sympathy that such a hearing would impose an
administrative burden on the city, but it noted that a governing entity is always
burdened by due process.76 The required hearing was not meant to be a
protracted proceeding but merely an opportunity for authorities to notify the
property owner of the seizure and provide them an opportunity to show why
the property should be released.77
Smith represented a turning point in forfeiture jurisprudence by requiring
post-seizure hearings in order to uphold due process. This requirement was a
departure from Seventh Circuit precedent, and it represented a shift in the way
that forfeiture actions would be applied.78 To prevent such a result from
occurring, the State promptly filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court.79 Those hoping that the law of due process and forfeiture could be
modified, however, would soon be disappointed.
III. ALVAREZ V. SMITH: THE COURT’S OPINION
While the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. City of Chicago addressed
the merits of the dispute by focusing on the due process implications of
forfeiture under DAFPA, the Supreme Court made no such sweeping
determinations on appeal. From the first moments of oral argument to the end
of the majority opinion, the Court approached the controversy in a markedly
different manner from that adopted by the Seventh Circuit.80 In an opinion by
Justice Breyer, the Court ultimately held that the injunctive claims of Smith

the importance of an automobile as a mode of transportation, the availability of hardship relief,
and the length of the deprivation. Id. at 837.
74. Smith, 524 F.3d at 838.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Smith had the potential to affect not only the DAFPA but also all forfeiture actions
adjudicated by the Seventh Circuit. Cf. id. at 839 (stating that the Seventh Circuit circulated the
Smith opinion to all judges of the court).
79. The petition was originally filed under the name of then State’s Attorney Richard A.
Devine who had been a named defendant in the initial action. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Devine v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576 (2009) (No. 08-351).
80. The Court’s choice to avoid the (comparatively exciting) due process issues addressed
by the Seventh Circuit did not go unnoticed. See Nathan Koppel, The Supreme Court Shows Off
Its Dull Side, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2009, 8:54 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/
15/the-supreme-court-shows-off-its-dull-side (commenting that the justices seemed more focused
on removing the case procedurally than deciding its substantive issues).
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and the other respondents were moot and that the ruling (and hearing
requirement) Judge Evans set forth for the Seventh Circuit should be vacated.81
Although the Court in Alvarez v. Smith initially granted certiorari to review
the merits of the case, admissions by both counsels during oral argument that
the underlying property claims of the respondents had been completed all but
assured that the Court would ultimately declare the case moot.82 Since the
respondents could no longer present valid claims for relief on the merits, the
Court held that an active “case or controversy” as required for standing under
Article III was not present.83 The Court further noted that since the
respondents’ attempt to file a class action had not been certified by the district
court,84 and since their actions for relief in the form of damages had not been
attached to the injunctive claim at issue,85 no controversy existed before it that
would sufficiently justify a ruling.86 Instead, the Court felt that by declaring
the matter moot and leaving the damages issue open, a path would be cleared
for relitigation.87
Although the Court can issue a ruling on the merits of a case in certain
exceptional situations where an active controversy may not be present, the
Court refused to review this claim under such an exception.88 Specifically, the
Court refused to hear this case as a matter “capable of repetition while evading
review.”89 The Court noted that the parties presented no evidence that the
individual claimants would be subject to subsequent victimization of seizure
procedures and that the matter was, therefore, not capable of repetition.90
Further, the Court held that the possibility of respondents litigating damages
claims prevented the action from evading review.91
While the Court was unanimous in reaching its mootness holding,
contention arose as to the proper treatment of the ruling below.92 The majority
held that since each of the listed claims had been resolved through their natural

81. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 578 (2009), vacating as moot Smith v. City of
Chicago, 524 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2008).
82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 57, Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. 576 (No. 08-351).
83. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580 (applying provisions of Article III, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 580.
86. Id. at 581.
87. Id. at 581, 583.
88. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581.
89. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 581 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1978)).
92. See id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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course, the decision of the lower court should be vacated.93 Justice Stevens,
dissenting in part, disagreed by noting that since at least one of the
respondents’ claims was resolved by discretionary settlement,94 the holding in
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership required that the
Court leave the Seventh Circuit’s opinion intact.95 The majority disagreed,
holding that the settlement on which Justice Stevens keyed was little more than
a “happenstance” occurrence through the natural progression of the seizure
process—an occurrence that would not prejudice the ability of the parties to refile their claims.96 In the end, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Smith was
vacated, the requirement that those subjected to forfeiture receive prompt postseizure hearings was nullified, and the merits of the case were ignored.97 By
holding the matter moot, the Court attempted to make it so that the
respondents’ claims had never been filed. The ultimate effects of their
decision, though, would be considerably more complicated.
IV. COMPLICATIONS WITH MOOTNESS AND RELITIGATION: ALVAREZ’S
DOUBLE-EDGED HOLDING
Although the holding in Alvarez was intended to allow relitigation, it may
inadvertently have led to complications for future litigants of forfeiture claims.
To properly understand the implications of such a double-edged holding,
multiple issues affected by Alvarez must be addressed. First, this part will
explain why it was proper for the claims in Alvarez to be held moot. Second,
93. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (majority opinion). The Court noted that it could “direct the
entry of any such appropriate judgment” that “may be just under the circumstances.” Id. at 581
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006)). As such, it could vacate the judgment of the lower court on a
moot matter in order to clear the path for future litigation, provided that equity and fairness
considerations did not tilt against such a ruling. Id. at 581, 583. If the lower court decision had
become moot by way of settlement, vacating the lower court’s decision could unfairly constrain
equity and fairness by eliminating the very purpose for which a party had voluntarily forfeited his
right to appeal. Id. at 582 (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18,
24–26 (1994). The Court found that since the six cases making up the action before it had been
remedied without any solid “procedural link” to the current dispute, they were mooted through
“happenstance” rather than through settlement and, thus, did not prevent vacatur of the judgment
below. Id.; see also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950) (describing
the manner in which lower decisions may be vacated).
94. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The claim of respondent
Michelle Waldo for $1,500 seized under DAFPA was resolved through a “compromise
settlement” that resulted in the return of her cash after the evidence had been weighed. Id. at 582
(majority opinion).
95. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens suggests that a more
prudential action, if the Court had mootness concerns, may have been to dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted, which would have allowed the opinion of the Seventh Circuit
to remain standing. Id.
96. Id. at 581–82 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 583.
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this part will address the propriety of the Court’s decision to vacate the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion. Finally, this part will detail complications resulting
from the vacatur so that the implications of Alvarez can come into full focus.
A.

The Claim was Properly Held Moot

Alvarez is a case filled with constitutional concerns that failed to present an
effective ruling on the controversial questions of law presented.98 After
looking at the absence of an active case or controversy and the difficulties
presented by trying to apply an exception though, it is clear that the Court
acted properly in holding respondents’ claims moot.
1.

There was No Active Case or Controversy Present

Under Article III of the Constitution, the Court is only allowed to issue
rulings on actual “Cases” or “Controversies” that are actively contested at all
stages of appellate review.99 If the issue at stake is no longer active when it is
presented to the Court, the parties lack a cognizable interest in the outcome of
the matter and the case should be dismissed as moot.100
Since the respondents in Alvarez lacked class certification,101 the Court
could consider only the claims of the six individuals joined to the matter.102
During oral argument, though, the Court confirmed that the individual claims
had already been resolved.103 After the resolution of these claims, including
the return of Chermane Smith’s car, there was no active controversy pending
before the Court; thus, any claim for an injunction would amount to nothing
more than an “abstract dispute about the law.”104
While the respondents argued that they had a claim of damages pending in
district court at the time of oral argument,105 that claim would also be unlikely
to provide the Respondents with any assistance in presenting a valid case or
controversy. Since each of the Respondents had their property seized by law
enforcement officials acting under DAFPA, any claims for damages against
those officials would be subject to a defense of qualified immunity.106 It is

98. See Koppel, supra note 80.
99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974)) (finding that controversies that are active at
the time the complaint is filed will not necessarily have standing throughout the litigation).
100. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (describing when the mootness
doctrine is properly used).
101. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580.
102. Id. at 580.
103. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 5.
104. See id.; see also Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580.
105. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580.
106. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)) (“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
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likely that even if the property had been seized in a manner that violated due
process, damages would not be available unless said seizure constituted a
clearly established violation of a constitutional right.107 Since seizures under
DAFPA are well supported by current law and since no hearing requirement
existed for officers to violate through continued possession,108 it is highly
unlikely that a damages claim would be successful unless a separate clearly
established violation occurred.109 Based on the absence of a judiciable claim,
the Court did not err in failing to find an active case or controversy.
2.

The Claim Was Not Admissible Under a Mootness Exception

While a mootness holding usually prevents the Court from hearing the
merits of a case, this result can be sidestepped in certain situations where a
court otherwise might never be able to rule on a particular legal issue. Cases
that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” can be heard on appeal
under an exception to the mootness doctrine despite the absence of a current
controversy by the time they reach the appellate level.110
Here, the claim presented by the respondents is not repeatable to the extent
that the individual actors are not likely to stand before a court at a later time
and argue the same issue.111 Although it is feasible that one of the
respondent’s property could again be subjected to forfeiture—particularly if

granted a qualified immunity and are ‘shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (“[Q]ualified immunity is ‘an immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . .’”).
107. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. Although an action against the municipality (City of Chicago)
would be permitted, the city would likely elect to settle any claim for damages to ensure that an
active controversy would not present the Court with an opportunity to limit available occasions
for forfeiture. See infra Part IV.C.3.
108. At the time of the seizure of Respondents’ property, the hearing requirement set forth by
the 7th Circuit was not yet in place. Cf. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 835 (7th Cir.
2008).
109. This lack of available action for damages also paradoxically supports the admission of
the claim under a mootness exception. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 37–
40 (1950) (finding that a holding of mootness should not prevent a claim for damages). In
Munsingwear, however, qualified immunity was not considered as a limiting factor, as the
underlying action for control of commodities did not implicate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
110. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 463–64
(2007) (ruling on constitutionality of campaign ads due to brevity of election cycle); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (ruling on constitutionality of abortion statute due to length of
human gestation period); Sloan v. Dep’t of Transp., 666 S.E.2d 236, 240 (S.C. 2008) (ruling on
constitutionality of emergency procurement of tax funds to road project due to limited time period
of emergency).
111. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 581 (2009) (“[N]othing suggests that the individual
plaintiffs will likely again prove subject to the State’s seizure procedures.”).
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Smith and her compatriots continue to allow their vehicles to transport
individuals involved in the drug trade—it is highly unlikely that such
interactions with law enforcement would happen often enough to trigger the
exception.112 The seizure and forfeiture of property is not analogous to the
natural occurrence of pregnancy or the passage of an election cycle—it is not
something that is destined to occur again.113 As such, it cannot be said that
Respondents’ claim was sufficiently “capable of repetition.”
The respondents have a better argument that their circumstances are
capable of evading review. Although the time constraints on individual
forfeiture actions push them towards mootness,114 the majority in Alvarez
brushed aside the notion that the cause could evade review by pointing to the
respondents’ pending damages claim.115 However, as discussed above, it is
possible that such a claim for damages could be blocked by qualified
immunity.116 If the respondents (who were denied the class certification
necessary to deliver a proper injunctive claim before the Court) were also
unable to present a claim for damages, it is possible that their action may have
evaded review in a manner that would trigger the exception.117 Since the
claimants here had a pending action below that would likely have been
applicable against the municipality, since not every future claimant will evade
class certification, and since the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

112. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983) (“[An individual] would
have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make
the incredible assertion . . . that all police officers . . . always [violate the rights of] any citizen
with whom they happen to have an encounter.”).
113. Compare Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105–06, with Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (pregnancy), and Wis.
Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463–64 (election cycle).
114. See cases cited supra note 110. If, as in Roe, a nine-month human gestation period will
not allow enough time for an action to reach the Court, it follows that a forfeiture with a lifespan
of 187 days is not likely to succeed either.
115. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581 (“[I]n any event, since those who are directly affected by the
forfeiture practices might bring damages actions, the practices do not ‘evade review.’”).
116. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. For this to occur, though, outside forces
(such as statutory excusal) would need to be present that would excuse the City of Chicago from
liability as well, as it has been well established that municipalities cannot adopt sovereign
immunity for themselves. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649–50 (1980). The
rarity of such an occurrence further supports the notion that the exception should not apply.
117. This fact cannot be the focus of an appeal by the present respondents as the Court’s
opinion is final and cannot be overturned. It could, however, be used by future litigants to fight a
denial of class certification that would effectively function as a dismissal of a claim for injunctive
relief. See discussion infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
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standard suggests that both elements must be present for the rule to apply,118 it
seems that the exception was properly refused in this instance.119
Since the respondents were not certified as a class, had no existing
damages claim, and could not present a live claim for injunctive relief, they
were not able to present an active case or controversy before the Court. As the
respondents’ claim failed to fulfill the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception, the Court acted properly by holding the matter moot.120
While this holding was sufficient and without controversy, the same cannot be
said for the Court’s decision to vacate the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.121
B.

The Court Should Not Have Vacated the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

If the first “edge” of mootness is its requirement that claims improperly
before the Court be dismissed, the second is the need to act on those dismissed
matters by summarily vacating their rulings.122 Federal courts commonly
vacate lower court decisions upon finding a matter moot to “clear[] the path for
future relitigation.”123 While it is true that an absence of conflicting opinions
can simplify relitigation, this logic should not have been applied in Alvarez.
The Court made a correct determination, as detailed above, in finding the
Respondents’ claims moot.124 However, as illustrated by Justice Stevens’
dissent, it acted improperly in vacating the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.125
The majority in Alvarez vacated the holding of the Seventh Circuit based
on the proposition that lower court decisions should be vacated if a case
becomes moot en route to the Supreme Court or while awaiting a decision on
the merits.126 By vacating the lower opinion, the majority noted that it cleared
the path for future relitigation of the parties’ issues while prejudicing none
with a preliminary ruling.127 The framework the majority used to vacate the
moot holding is well-intentioned and consistently applied, but it needs to be

118. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 n.2 (1988) (indicating that both elements of the test
must be present).
119. Regardless of whether such a claim can actually “evade review,” it is not likely to be
“capable of repetition” and, therefore, still fails to fulfill the exception. Cf. City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983).
120. See Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581.
121. See, e.g., id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
122. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974).
123. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950). See also id. at 39 n.2
(listing examples). Much like for the initial finding of mootness, exceptions to the rule of vacatur
exist that ensure the court is not required to vacate the lower court’s opinion in every case that
fails to present a case or controversy. Id.
124. See supra Part IV.A.
125. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 581 (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39).
127. Id. (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40).
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remembered that said framework can be undermined in certain exceptional
situations.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, highlights one such situation while
presenting a reasonable explanation as to why the lower decision should not
have been vacated. In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership, the Court held that mootness determinations that were based on a
controversy being resolved by settlement should not be vacated, as vacatur
amounted to the government overruling a voluntary agreement between the
involved parties.128 For Stevens, the hand-waving that the majority used to
circumvent the obvious settlement of one of the respondents’ claims was not
enough to disguise the fact that at least one of the claims below was completed
via voluntary action, and the very case that the majority relied upon suggested
that such a result should be left in place.129
Justice Stevens’ opinion in this matter illustrates that the vacatur of the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion was wrong for two reasons. First, Justice Stevens
points out that the majority entertained a misguided assumption that the
agreement between Respondent Waldo and the State’s Attorney was merely a
“happenstance” result and not a settlement.130 While it is true that the return of
Waldo’s property was a natural event that occurred at the end of the forfeiture
proceedings,131 it is nevertheless also true that this end was reached as a result
of a discretionary agreement the parties entered into, where legal rights to
certain property were exchanged for a particular litigation result.132 Under
Bancorp, Justice Stevens argues, the settlement should have been sufficient to
uphold the decision of the lower court.133
Second, Justice Stevens notes that vacatur of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion
was improper because it was inappropriate to summarily dispose of a case
where the judiciable issues were voluntarily abandoned.134 Justice Stevens
supported this from an equitable standpoint by stating that the public (and the
law) are “better served by leaving appellate judgments intact.”135 While the
128. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner
Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26, 29 (1994)).
129. Id. 584. Justice Stevens objects to the majority’s failure to follow precedent, noting
“[W]e will typically decline to vacate when ‘the party seeking relief from the judgment below
caused the mootness by voluntary action.’” Id. at 583 (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24).
130. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 584.
131. Id. The State returned the $1,500 seized from Waldo as part of a compromise settlement
on March 19, 2007, fourteen months after the initial seizure. Id. at 582 (majority opinion).
132. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 584 (citing Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24–26).
134. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The mootness determination should
particularly not be applied with such retroactive aplomb because the issue was still live at the
time that the Seventh Circuit heard it.
135. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). “Judicial precedents are
presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the
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majority felt that vacating the Seventh Circuit’s opinion would give the
respondents the clearest possible path for relitigating the merits, it seems to
have ignored the fact that it could have been hearing the merits itself had
respondent Waldo not previously settled her claim.136 By vacating the
judgment, the Court seemed to tell the respondents to come back tomorrow,
after quickly forgetting that their problem could easily have been solved today.
Because there was a settlement that should have prevented the Court’s
traditional vacatur of the lower court and because the law is better served by
leaving decisions intact, Justice Stevens seems to be correct in his notion that
the Court erred in vacating the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. While the Court
may have thought it was making relitigation of similar claims simpler, it may
have done just the opposite.
C. Property Owners Subject to Forfeiture Face A Difficult Path for
Relitigation
Although Alvarez intended to clear a path for relitigation, it gave rise to
numerous procedural consequences that require discussion to decipher. The
prospects for relitigation may not be clear, but they can at least be clarified to
the point where they are understandable.
1.

The Issues in Alvarez are Still Alive

While the respondents would be hard pressed to describe the Court’s
actions in holding their claims moot and vacating the ruling of the Seventh
Circuit as a victory, the outcome of Alvarez could have been much less
positive. Although the Court struck down the Seventh Circuit’s probable cause
hearing requirement, it did not reverse the lower court’s reasoning on the
merits by stating that pre-forfeiture hearings would never be required.137 In
this sense, the Court’s claim that it was “clear[ing] the path for future
relitigation”138 rang true, as the legal issues that characterized the merits of

property of private litigants . . . .” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S.
at 26).
136. Had respondent Waldo chosen not to settle but to instead pursue additional action, it is
possible, albeit unlikely, that her claim could have been outstanding at the time this matter was
heard. Regardless of the timing, though, the voluntary nature of the settlement should have
prevented vacatur.
137. See Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583. While vacatur of a lower court’s decision is inevitably
part of any reversal by the Supreme Court, such nullification of a holding neither applies outside
the original jurisdiction nor carries the weight of precedent that a reversal does. For more on the
differences between reversals and simple vacatur, see 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review §§ 791,
803 (2007).
138. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear,
Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950)).
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Alvarez were left unresolved and remain ripe for review.139 While the issues
remain alive, the Court’s finding of mootness may have indirectly made the
relitigation process more complicated than originally expected.
2.

The Problem with Relitigation: Mootness and Class Actions

Alvarez has created a circumstance where certain forfeiture claims can
only be challenged in a particular procedural manner.140 While the procedural
aspects of litigation are always important, the mootness and vacatur holdings
in Alvarez demonstrate that improperly advancing a forfeiture action will doom
a party’s claim and prevent substantive advancement of the law.141 Parties
litigating injunctive forfeiture claims in light of Alvarez must properly evaluate
at an early stage whether they can act as a class, as proper pleading
conventions will make all the difference in whether claims are heard by the
Court.
As seen in Alvarez, individual claims for injunctive relief under DAFPA
are unlikely to succeed. Unless a case is fast-tracked for an unforeseeable
reason,142 forfeiture claims under the statute are unlikely to reach the Supreme
Court before an individual property dispute is resolved and subjected to a
mootness determination.143 Based on this unfortunate fact, any “clear[] path
for future relitigation”144 that would enable substantive changes in forfeiture
law is not likely to come through an injunctive claim by individual plaintiffs.

139. Without ruling on the merits, an appellate court cannot issue an opinion fully reversing
the legal reasoning of the lower court. Thus, future action is permissible because the controversy
presented in Alvarez “has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently
congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.” 22A AM. JUR. 2D
Declaratory Judgments § 32 (2003) (citing BKHN, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 3 Cal. App. 4th
301, 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
140. It should be noted that if the opinion of the Seventh Circuit had not been vacated,
relitigation may not have been necessary. The probable cause hearings established by the
Seventh Circuit, if present, would have cured a good deal of the due process concerns associated
with DAFPA. While it is true that some litigants may have tried to appeal the law itself (or that
individuals from other circuits who had not received the benefit of the hearing requirement could
file claims), a mootness holding that had followed Bancorp and upheld the Seventh Circuit would
have likely prevented relitigation by removing the very need for the litigation.
141. See Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580–81. Respondents’ failure to litigate their case in a manner
that presented an active controversy to the Court foreclosed the Court’s ability to issue a
substantive ruling on the merits. Id.
142. DAFPA, unlike certain federal statutes, does not have a provision for expedited review
by the Supreme Court, and it should not be expected that actions filed under its provisions will
make it before the Court with any unusual speed. But see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 428–29 (1998) (discussing expedited review of the constitutionality of the line item veto via
a provision in the Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1994)).
143. See supra text accompanying note 65.
144. Cf. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583.
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Class actions, on the other hand, face much better prospects. As
acknowledged by Justice Scalia during the oral arguments for Alvarez, the
formation of a class would have provided Respondents with advantages
throughout litigation.145 The nature of the class as a legal entity would have
allowed the Court to assume that some of the class members still had active
injunctive claims pending that could have been justifiably heard on the
merits.146 Since such a class was not certified, though, the respondents were
forced to move forward as a group of individual actors—all but dooming their
cases due to the time restraints placed on injunctive relief.147
The necessity of class action leads to an unusual concentration of
procedural power. Because of the threat of mootness in forfeiture matters, the
ability to certify or deny a class allows the district court judge to essentially
determine whether litigation will continue.148 It could be argued that this is not
notable because district court judges have certification power in any case and
because decisions on class certification can be appealed. But, because
individual claims are so likely to be mooted due to the short window of time in
which Illinois forfeiture actions are justiciable, the decision of a district judge
takes on particular import.149
As far as forfeiture claims under DAFPA are concerned, then, a district
court’s denial of class certification effectively amounts to a sua sponte
dismissal. After Alvarez, individuals facing forfeiture lost the ability to seek
probable cause hearings150 and effectively lost the ability to file individually
due to the Court’s mootness determination and the timing provisions of
DAFPA.151 The only realistic hope that remains for relitigating forfeiture
claims after Alvarez, then, is through the proper certification of a class. As a
result of Alvarez’s convoluted procedural effects, forfeiture relief can be
effectively obtained only through class action, and the effectiveness of that
class will depend heavily upon the certification decision of a single judge.
145. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 38.
146. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (“[T]he termination of a
class representative’s claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class.”).
147. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580 (“The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ class certification
motion. . . . Hence the only disputes relevant here are those between these six plaintiffs and the
State’s Attorney.”).
148. But see U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980) (acknowledging that
the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” remains available where class certification is
denied). Such an appeal could lead to the possibility of further litigation after the district court’s
initial determination.
149. See Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2008) (detailing that claims
under DAFPA will largely be resolved within the187-day time limit between seizure and the final
forfeiture proceeding).
150. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (describing the Court’s vacatur of the Seventh Circuit’s
Opinion).
151. Cf. id. at 581.
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Damages, Qualified Immunity, and Pearson as a Roundabout Path to
the Merits

While the success of a claim for injunctive relief is determined by whether
it is brought by an individual or through a class action, claims for damages
present a different story. Unlike claims for injunctive relief, claims for
damages are evergreen in nature and not subject to dismissal for mootness.152
Regardless of how appealing actions for damages may seem at the outset,
though, they too face complications in providing a clear path back to the
Supreme Court because of the protections that qualified immunity affords to
state officials.153
To withstand a qualified immunity defense, a litigant must demonstrate
that there was a clearly established constitutional violation by a state actor.154
However, since DAFPA plainly grants officers the authority to engage in the
seizure of property associated with certain crimes, it will be difficult for
litigants to show clear due process violations without the aid of probable cause
hearings like those advocated by the Seventh Circuit.155 Plaintiffs can,
therefore, still file claims for damages against the municipality or state agency
that employed the officers,156 but the chances of such a claim ever being
appealed to the point where it could influence policy are slim. Government
actors would likely choose to settle a few isolated claims over defending
against actions that could lead to adverse rulings and thereby loss of funding
from forfeiture activity.157
If courts were progressively inclined, though, judges at every level could
adopt a procedural framework that might enable plaintiffs to receive a valid
ruling on the merits of their claims, despite the presence of a legitimate
qualified immunity defense. Traditionally, inquiries as to whether a damages
152. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,
8–9 (1978)).
153. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
154. See id.
155. Had the Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement been upheld, it is possible that future
litigants could claim a clearly established violation if they were denied access to such a
proceeding. This is mere conjecture, though, as that requirement was vacated in Alvarez.
156. Cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (noting that municipalities
cannot use qualified immunity to claim protection from civil rights actions).
157. Such a scenario demonstrates how success for the respondents in such a suit would be
different from what would be considered successful from a standpoint of constitutional
progression. Respondents may find a settlement for damages inflicted by their inability to use
their vehicles to be a successful resolution to the case. Yet, such a settlement would not be a
success from a doctrinal standpoint, as it could not be appealed to the Supreme Court and thereby
allow for a substantive change to forfeiture jurisprudence. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v.
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994). In this sense, the City of Chicago could indefinitely
receive extensive funding through DAFPA forfeiture so long as it generously settled claims
properly filed against it.
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claim should be negated by qualified immunity were separate and distinct from
inquiries on the merits in those same causes of action.158 Because qualified
immunity was seen as immunity from suit and not just immunity from liability,
courts could avoid ruling on the merits of a claim against a governmental agent
entitled to qualified immunity, since the merits of that claim would never
technically be at issue.159 Thus, Saucier v. Katz required courts to decide
qualified immunity claims first, as there was no point in ruling on the merits of
a claim if later it could be found that the parties were immune from suit.160
As of early 2009, however, this procedural framework is no longer
required. In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court overruled the Saucier doctrine by
finding that judges “should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in
deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”161
Based on this, a court hearing a damages claim could rule on the merits of the
seizure before qualified immunity even became a question.162 While this
holding would not rescue the respondents’ damages claim in Alvarez, it could
allow for the merits of a damages claim against an officer engaged in DAFPA
forfeiture to climb the appellate ladder. If a court would be progressive
enough to adopt this alternate framework, Pearson could provide a back door
for relitigation.163
By holding the respondents’ claims in Alvarez moot and vacating the
judgment of the Seventh Circuit, the Court created a situation where the path to
relitigation—that it touted so highly—became convoluted and heavily
influenced by a very small number of procedural choices. While the Court
made the correct determination in holding the matter moot, its reversal of the
Seventh Circuit’s decision and the challenging path it has forced relitigation
efforts to follow will make it difficult for forfeitures under DAFPA to be
challenged in the near future unless progressive changes to existing case law
are voluntarily exercised. For this reason, the Court erred in failing to consider
the merits of the respondents’ claims.

158. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
159. Id. at 200–01.
160. Id.
161. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
162. Id.
163. Pearson merely gave courts the option to consider the merits first. See id. Courts
remain free to follow the traditional framework. Id.
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V. AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED: THE HEARING REQUIREMENT AND THE
UNADDRESSED MERITS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION
Until the Supreme Court takes up the interaction between due process and
forfeiture in a case with a justiciable conflict, potential litigants will be forced
to walk the convoluted path of forfeiture litigation without having any idea of
what result awaits them. When that day comes, though, how should the court
rule? To answer this question, the merits of Alvarez must be considered.
A.

Post-Seizure Hearings Protect the Due Process Rights of Those Subjected
to Forfeiture

It is clear that due process is “conferred, not by legislative grace, but by
As such, there is no question that its
constitutional guarantee.”164
constitutional authority will require certain procedural benchmarks for any
seizure.165 A more pressing question, though, is whether the statutory
forfeiture proceedings are sufficient to satisfy due process.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court held that determining whether due
process required a statute to provide additional procedural protection depended
on consideration of the parties’ private interest, the risk of wrongful
deprivation related to the benefits of additional safeguards, and the
government’s interest in avoiding further burdens on its seizure power.166 This
standard is flexible and calls for protections to be provided as a particular
situation demands—ensuring that neither the government nor the party subject
to forfeiture will be unduly burdened.
Mathews’s pattern of requiring further procedural action was exemplified
in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, when it was applied to
determine what procedures were required prior to forfeiture.167 There, the
Court found that due process required individuals be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the government deprived them of real property,
and only in extraordinary situations—where a government interest was at
stake—could that hearing be postponed until after a seizure occurred.168
Although it was argued that the ultimate forfeiture proceedings in the seizure
statute would fulfill this goal, the Court applied Mathews and held that an
additional hearing was required for a government actor to engage in the seizure
of real property.169 The provision of an additional hearing prevented seizure of

164. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
165. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (“[T]he [individual’s] interest in
avoiding . . . loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.”).
166. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
167. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 55.
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property where owners would have to wait months before presenting valid
defenses at ultimate forfeiture proceedings.170
The application of this standard to personal property could later be seen in
Krimstock v. Kelly.171 There, the court applied Mathews to a New York
forfeiture statute that was challenged after several automobiles were seized
under its provisions.172 Then-Judge Sotomayor, writing for the court, applied
the Mathews test to balance the substantial individual interest in uninterrupted
use of an automobile173 against the government’s interest in retaining vehicles
that it believed it could eventually take possession of through forfeiture.174
Under this framework, Judge Sotomayor found that since the procedures
provided for by statute presented such a remarkably high risk of erroneous or
excessive deprivation, and since this deprivation had the potential to so
drastically affect the livelihood of those impacted, further procedural
constraints on the statute were required to satisfy the concerns of due
process.175 Using Mathews, Judge Sotomayor was able to determine that a
prompt, post-seizure hearing needed to be provided prior to final forfeiture
proceedings to fulfill the requirements of due process.176
Because of Mathews’s flexibility in application and its pedigree of use in
due process actions, it could easily have been applied to the merits in Alvarez
and very well could have lead to a similar result as in Krimstock.

170. Id. at 56.
171. 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002).
172. Id. at 44, 60–68 (applying Mathews’s due process concerns to determine the propriety of
N.Y.C. Code § 14-140).
173. Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1977)
(finding that uninterrupted use of a vehicle needs to be protected as it is something on which the
owner’s “ability to make a living” may depend).
174. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 64. The government’s interest amounted to reluctance to release
vehicles it believed it could eventually seize, out of fear that those vehicles might never come
back into its possession. Id. (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
679 (1974) (stating that when property is easily transportable, the need to retain custody to
prevent its disappearance is heightened)).
175. Id. The Court justified the additional constraints by noting that the availability of
forfeiture proceedings may not adequately compensate parties for losses caused by improper
seizure.
“Given the congested civil dockets in federal courts, a claimant may not receive an
adversary hearing until many months after the seizure.” . . . [And even then,] an owner
cannot recover the lost use of a vehicle by prevailing in a forfeiture proceeding. The loss
is felt in the owner’s inability to use a vehicle that continues to depreciate in value as it
stands idle in the police lot.
Id. (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 56 (1993)).
176. Id. at 70.
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Post-Seizure Hearings are Unnecessary and Redundant

Despite its flexibility, Mathews is not the only test that could be applied by
the Court to determine whether post-seizure hearings are required to protect
due process in forfeiture actions under DAFPA. A number of cases applying
the speedy trial test of Barker v. Wingo177 have found that forfeiture statutes’
ultimate forfeiture proceedings provide a sufficient procedural opportunity for
those from whom property has been seized to voice their complaints.178 If the
Court in Alvarez were to adopt this approach, post-seizure hearings, such as
those provided for by the Seventh Circuit, would not be required.179
In Barker, the Court found that due process entitled a defendant to a
speedy trial, and determining whether this standard was met necessitated
balancing four factors: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”180 Although
initially limited to examination of delays in criminal trials, these factors have
also been used to determine whether delays in civil proceedings represent
violations of due process.181
In United States v. Von Neumann, the Court applied Barker in finding that
the delay between the seizure of the plaintiff’s car and the ultimate forfeiture
proceedings did not represent a violation of due process.182 In that case, the
plaintiff’s car was seized by customs agents and held subject to the payment of
a bond or a forfeiture proceeding.183 Although the plaintiff paid the bond, he
filed suit for a violation of due process.184 The Court, applying Barker, held
that the delay between seizure and release of the vehicle did not violate due
process, because the available forfeiture proceedings would have provided a
sufficient forum for contesting the seizure, and because the delay between
seizure and those proceedings did not prejudice the plaintiff’s defense.185
Under Barker, only the most extreme delays between seizure and final
disposition violate due process. Essentially, so long as the government
provides a forfeiture proceeding that enables the plaintiff to eventually
challenge the propriety of a seizure, the speedy trial standard will be

177. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986); United States v.
$8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 569–70 (1983).
179. This is not meant to suggest that no proceedings whatsoever would be required. Rather,
the Barker line of cases puts forth the opinion that the ultimate forfeiture proceeding sufficiently
fulfills all relevant due process concerns.
180. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
181. See $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. at 564.
182. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 250–51.
183. Id. at 245–46.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 250–51.
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satisfied.186 This was the case in United States v. $8,850, where the Court
found that an eighteen-month delay between seizure and forfeiture proceedings
did not violate Barker.187 There, the Court recognized that the delay
constituted a “substantial period of time,” but found it reasonable as “[t]he
Government must be allowed some time to decide whether to institute
forfeiture proceedings.”188
If Barker could apply to eighteen-month delays and cars seized by customs
officials, it is only proper to think it could apply equally well to delays of up to
187 days and cars seized under state statute. Based on the simplicity of
Barker’s speedy trial result, it could very well have been applied by the Court
in Alvarez to streamline forfeiture jurisprudence.
C. A Proper Result and an Opportunity Missed
Although determining which due process test to use is something of an
outcome-determinative exercise, the Court should have used the Mathews test
to determine whether the respondents in Alvarez were entitled to post-seizure
hearings, because of Mathews’s inherent flexibility and the present similarities
with cases that have adopted its provisions.189
If Mathews’s balancing test were to be applied to Alvarez, the Court’s
ruling would likely track those of similar claims applying the same standard
(particularly given the addition of Justice Sotomayor to the Bench).190
Because Krimstock and James Daniel Good Real Property dealt with factual
scenarios similar to those in Alvarez, the post-seizure hearing advocated by the
Seventh Circuit would likely have been upheld under a Mathews analysis.
Through such a holding, the Court would show that due process in forfeiture
actions is concerned less with the timing of hearings and more with parties’
ability to plead while their words still have an effect.191
Further, upholding the Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement would have
allowed the Court to take a major step towards reducing government abuse of
forfeiture as a fundraising mechanism. As Professors Miller and Selva pointed

186. Id. at 250.
187. United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 569–70 (1983).
188. Id. at 565, 569.
189. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
190. Justice Sotomayor, who wrote the opinion in Krimstock, was elevated to the Supreme
Court by President Obama shortly before oral argument was heard in Alvarez. Cf. Charlie
Savage, Sotomayor Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 8, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/us/politics/09sotomayor.html.
191. Cf. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. at 556 (holding that an eighteen-month gap
between seizure and forfeiture proceedings still allows an appropriate forum for review and the
presentation of possible defenses). Although such a claim was justified under Barker from a
timing standpoint, it is clear under Mathews that such a delay would not allow for the plaintiffs to
obtain hearings on their claims that could be seen as upholding due process.
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out, police departments, municipalities, and government agencies receive great
returns from engaging in forfeiture activity.192 In 2008 alone, the Chicago
Police Department—which performed the seizures that were the subject of
Alvarez—took in nearly $13.5 million in forfeiture assets.193 These returns
provide officers with the incentive to violate rights in order to seize valuable
property.194 By requiring post-seizure hearings, the Court would have forced
officers to justify their seizures long before those subjected to forfeiture lose
hope of reclaiming their property and agree to give up their rights to forfeiture
proceedings in exchange for nominal settlements.195 By regulating the selfinterested nature of police action in this manner, the Court would use Mathews
to strengthen due process without preventing agencies from collecting on
properly seized assets—a regulation to which only dishonest organizations
would likely object.
The Barker test could be applied to these circumstances, but it would allow
them to properly affect ideas of due process. Granted, it would be convenient
to apply the speedy trial standard to cases such as Alvarez, but it must never be
forgotten that, although forfeiture actions run parallel to criminal ones, the
forfeiture track contains parties with markedly different goals.196 Applying
Barker allows the Court to see if an unreasonable delay has occurred, but
prevents it from ignoring such delays if proceedings are already in place.
Additionally, while applying Barker allowed the Court in $8,850 in U.S.
Currency to declare delays up to eighteen months could be reasonable, the
customs seizures of cash in that case cannot be compared to the vehicle seizure
here.197 As the Seventh Circuit stated in Smith, “Our society is, for good or
not, highly dependent on the automobile. The hardship posed by the loss of
one’s means of transportation . . . is hard to calculate.”198 A delay this
excessive, whether 187 days or 18 months, would violate due process by
preventing parties from seeking relief, and Barker could not be applied in good
conscience if it would permit such a ruling.199
To ensure the provision of due process and to reduce the number of
seizures improperly motivated by officers’ or municipalities’ desire for
monetary gain, the respondents in Alvarez should have been given an

192. See Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 317–18.
193. Editorial, Police for Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24–25, 2009, at A14.
194. See Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 317–18.
195. Cf. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 582 (2009) (detailing Respondent Waldo’s
settlement). It is possible that had Waldo received a post-seizure probable cause hearing, she
would have realized her claim had merit and refused to settle.
196. See supra Part I.A–C.
197. See United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983).
198. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008).
199. See Ilya Somin, Forfeiture Laws, the War of Drugs, and Alvarez v. Smith, FINDLAW
.COM (Oct. 14, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20091014_somin.html.
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opportunity for a hearing before a neutral party. Had the Court been able to
issue a ruling on the merits in Alvarez, it would have done well by applying
Mathews and upholding the Seventh Circuit’s post-seizure hearing
requirement.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court properly held Alvarez v. Smith moot because the case
presented no active case or controversy, but by vacating the Seventh Circuit’s
decision, the Court did less to ease relitigation than it did to complicate the
path of future forfeiture claims. As a result of the hurried timeframes of
DAFPA forfeiture actions, the effect of qualified immunity on damages claims,
and the Court’s vacatur of the Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement, Alvarez
complicated the process of challenging government forfeitures.
After wading through this quagmire, it becomes difficult to fathom that
despite these complications, Alvarez had little effect on the substantive law of
forfeiture. Granted, it is possible, based on the application of the Mathews
standard and the recent elevation of Justice Sotomayor to the Court, that the
Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement could have been upheld had the court
reached the merits of the case. But without an opinion, this will never be
certain. In Alvarez, the Court seems to have taken pride in further convoluting
one of the already complicated paths to its door. Luckily, as long as police
departments can wield the double-edged sword that is forfeiture, another civil
action will inevitably allow for a ruling on the propriety of its use.
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